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NOTES AND COMMENTS
KOKKONEN v. GUARDIAN LIFE: LIMITING
THE POWER OF FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS IN DISMISSED CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
The enforcement of settlement agreements is not a sexy subject,
but it is intensely relevant to the life of the practicing lawyer and that
lawyer's clients.' In a rare unanimous opinion,2 the United States
Supreme Court recently answered the divisive question 3 of whether a
federal district court possesses "inherent" subject matter jurisdiction4
to enforce a settlement agreement between parties whose case was
dismissed from federal court with prejudice, pursuant to the agree-
ment, and over which the court has no remaining independent
grounds for jurisdiction.
In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.,5 the United States
Supreme Court flatly rejected the Ninth Circuit's assertion of such
1. See, ag., Robert L. Haig and Steven P. Caley, Deep Pocket Perils: Defendants Rich in
Resources Must Overcome Bias, 80 A.B.A. J. 59 (Dec. 1994); Peter Toll Hoffnan, Valuation of
Cases for Settlement" Theory and Practice, 1991 J. Disp. RESOL 1.
2. Judge Shadur of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has
noted that the Kokkonen decision "represents an instance of a somewhat rare phenomenon: a
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court." Smith v. Martin, 1994 WL 529325 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
3. The question had divided the federal circuit. See infra notes 13-31 and accompanying
text.
4. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to hear and adjudicate cases of
the general class or category to which proceedings in question belong. Standard Oil Co. v.
Montecatini Edison, 342 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D.D.C. 1989). A federal court will have subject
matter jurisdiction to hear a dispute if it presents a federal question or if the parties are "di-
verse." Federal questions are those that arise "under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ... ." U.S. CoNST. art.
Il, § 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) provides that "[t]he district court shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions" arising under the same authorities. Federal statutes and common law, admin-
istrative regulations and matters involving interstate commerce can all create a "federal ques-
tion." See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL-, CvIL PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 13-19 (2d ed. 1993).
Diversity jurisdiction involves parties from different states who have met a jurisdictional
minimum amount in controversy, currently $50,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). This form of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction arises under the Constitutional extension of judicial power "to Contro-
versies ... between Citizens of different States.... and between a State, or the Citizens thereof
and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." U.S. CoNsT. art. i1, § 2.
5. 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994).
1
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"inherent" jurisdiction.6 The Court held that the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction does not extend to this type of case.7 Furthermore, be-
cause a settlement agreement is a contract, unless a district court
makes compliance with a settlement agreement part of its dismissal8
or unless the parties seek the retention of court jurisdiction,9 a litigant
must ask a state court to enforce a settlement agreement, absent an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.10 The Court's decision to
articulate a "bright line" rule put to rest a dispute among the federal
circuits" and eased the concerns of Oklahoma and eight other states
who had urged that a recognition of such "inherent" jurisdiction
would be an inexcusable affront to state sovereignty."2 Because the
decision reduces judicial uncertainty, preserves state sovereignty over
settlement disputes, preserves due process, helps federal courts dis-
charge overbearing dockets, and articulates clear guidelines for parties
and attorneys who seek federal supervision of their settlement agree-
ments, the decision. is a welcome judicial development.
II. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
Prior to May 16, 1994, a litigant in federal court had little cer-
tainty that a settlement agreement it reached would be enforced by
the federal court in which it had filed the action. 3 The Circuits had
split over the issue, and no "bright line" rule existed.
6. Id. at 1675.
7. Ld. at 1676.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) states that "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdi-
vision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of
the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper .... " (emphasis added).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii) provides:
[s]ubject to the provisions of Rule 23(e) [prohibiting party dismissal of class actions], of
Rule 66 [prohibiting party dismissal where a receiver has been appointed], and of any
statute of the United States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order
of the court ... by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have ap-
peared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation,
the dismissal is without prejudice .... (emphasis added).
10. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1677.
11. See infra notes 13-31 and accompanying text.
12. Oklahoma joined Ohio, Alaska, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, Penn-
sylvania, Virginia, and the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in support of Kokkonen. Brief
for the States of Ohio, Alaska, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Virginia, and the District of Columbia as Amid Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kok-
konen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1363 (1994) (No. 93-263) [hereinafter Brief for the
States].
13. This is the date on which Kokkonen was decided.
[Vol. 30:671
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The issue raised in Kokkonen divided the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal. 4 The Third,' 5 Fourth 6 , Fifth,' 7 Seventh,'8 and
Eighth19 Circuits rejected inherent jurisdiction under circumstances
similar to those in the Ninth Circuit case. Appellate courts for the
First,20 Sixth,2' Eleventh 22 and Ninth23 Circuits decided cases that
seemed to leave the door open to jurisdiction.
Those courts that recognized post-settlement jurisdiction did so
for several reasons. These included the views that a settlement agree-
ment was not an independent contract,' that the continuing exercise
14. For recent law review commentaries that discuss this split, see Alyson Weiss, Note, Fed-
eral Jurisdiction to Enforce a Settlement Agreement After Vacating a Dismissal Order Under Rule
60(b)(6), 10 CnRDozo L. REV. 2137 (1989); Note, Postdismissal Enforcement of Settlement
Agreements in Federal Court and the Problem of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 9 Rnv. LrrxG. 249
(1990).
15. In Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a
district court lacks the power to enforce a settlement agreement "which is the basis of, but not
incorporated into, an order or judgment of the court." 989 F.2d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1993).
16. Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. County of Falrfax, 571 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1978).
The Fourth Circuit dismissed this civil rights appeal because the settlement agreement had not
been approved or incorporated into a court order, nor was there any independent ground for
federal jurisdiction. Id.
17. In Langley v. Jackson State Univ., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that a dis-
trict court may only in limited circumstances hear a post-dismissal motion to enforce a settle-
ment agreement: "Once a court dismisses an action with prejudice because of a settlement
agreement, and the agreement is neither approved of nor incorporated by the court in its decree
or order and the court does not indicate any intention to retain jurisdiction, an action to enforce
the settlement agreement requires federal jurisdiction independent of the action that was set-
tled." 14 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1994).
18. Judge Richard Posner, one of the early Law and Economics proponents who argued for
an ever wiser expenditure of scarce judicial resources, was unwilling to affirm district court juris-
diction under facts similar to those in Kokkonen. Absent an independent basis for exercising
federal jurisdiction over settlement agreements, "there must be a deliberate retention of jurisdic-
tion, as by issuing an injunction or stating that jurisdiction is retained for a particular purpose."
McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1190 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Note, Postdismissal En-
forcement of Settlement Agreements, 9 R~v. LrFIG. 249,256 (1990); Lucille v. City of Chicago, 31
F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating "McCall-Bey disposes of the contention that just because
the initial stiit sought to vindicate a federal right, the court possesses federal-question jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to construe and enforce a contract ending the litigation.").
19. Aduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1987); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins
Co., 747 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1984).
20. Dankese v. Defense Logistics Agency, 693 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v.
Baus, 834 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1987).
21. Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368,1374 (6th Cir. 1976) (granting vacation of
dismissal without prejudice of patent infringement action under FED. R. Crv. P. 60 (b)(6), and
granting order of specific performance of settlement agreement which caused suit's dismissal).
22. Kent v. Baker, 815 F.2d 1395 (11th Cir. 1987).
23. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. 92-16628, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12448 (un-
published) (9th Cir. 1993); Wilkinson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 922 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.
1991). For a recent application of the Kokkonen rule to a civil rights action see Sims v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 1994 WL 564701 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
24. Aro Corp., 531 F.2d at 1374. The Ninth Circuit's unpublished opinion in Kokkonen is
also among those cases that seems to rely on the fact that the settlement agreement would not
have existed but for the litigation: "[T]he district court may, following its dismissal of an action
3
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of jurisdiction was a cost efficient use of judicial resources,25 and that
Court authority would founder without the power to enforce settle-
ment agreements.26
Those circuits that rejected the "inherent power" to enforce set-
tlement agreements between diversity litigants27 who had left the
courthouse without clear court retention of jurisdiction did so for sev-
eral reasons. First, even though a settlement agreement did not arise
separately from current or threatened litigation, the resulting contract
does not sufficiently depend on that litigation to warrant its enforce-
ment by a federal court?28 It may, however, be dependent enough for
a court to vacate its dismissal order under Rule 60(b).29 Second, some
courts held that the "inherent power" doctrine was part and parcel of
the general jurisdiction of state courts, and that the doctrine, there-
fore, could not be supported by the specific and limited jurisdiction of
federal courts. 0 Third, "inherent jurisdiction" was rejected because it
was analytically too abstract; its boundaries were unclear, and there-
fore, it was "too soft" to sustain a jurisdictional foundation.3 1
III. OKLAHOMA'S PLEA
Oklahoma joined Ohio, Alaska, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Montana, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the District of Columbia in sup-
porting Kokkonen's sole claim that a federal district court should not
have the power to enforce settlement agreements between litigants
who have not retained federal district court jurisdiction as a part of
pursuant to a settlement agreement, enter a subsequent order enforcing the terms of the agree-
ment." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. 92-16628, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12448, at *1
(unpublished) (9th Cir. 1993).
25. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. 92-16628, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12448, at *1
(unpublished) (9th Cir. 1993); Aro Corp., 513 F.2d at 1371.
26. Cf. United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1124 (1st Cir. 1987).
27. Litigants who appear in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, as opposed
to those who are there due to a federal question raised by their claim. See supra note 4.
28. Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. Fairfax County, 571 F.2d 1299, 1305 (4th Cir.
1978); cf. Gardiner v. A. H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1188-89 (8th Cir. 1984).
29. FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b) provides, in part, that
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following rea-
sons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evi-
dence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud .... misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party; ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of thejudgment.
For an explication of the Rule and its applications, see Fairfax, 571 F.2d at 1299.
30. Fairfax, 571 F.2d at 1304.
31. Mc-Call Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.).
[Vol. 30:671
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the settlement.'2 Oklahoma joined the amicus brief because it was
"concerned about the untenably broad conception of federal jurisdic-tion" asserted in the Ninth Circuit's opinion. 3 The States argued that
the generalized "supervisory jurisdiction"3 4 of federal courts should
be strictly circumscribed because any broader application "is incom-
patible with a proper understanding of judicial self-restraint, threatens
accepted principles of federalism, and violates the separation of pow-
ers .. ..,35
Oklahoma did not argue that the doctrine of "supervisory juris-
diction" had no place in federal courts. Rather, it asserted with the
amici that the Ninth Circuit had used the doctrine in an "improper
and uncontrolled manner."36 The Ninth Circuit had ignored the dis-
tinction between a settlement agreement between parties and the re-
tention of court jurisdiction entered as an order of the court.37
Furthermore, the amici argued that the Ninth Circuit applied the
wrong test to determine whether a district court could retain jurisdic-
tion; the appropriate test, they argued, was "whether the court en-
tered a formal order containing binding terms subject to further
enforcement. ' 38  According to the amici, it should not matter what
time a settlement is reached, 9 whether the judge actively participates
in the settlement negotiations' or manifests subjective intentions re-
lated to continuing jurisdiction,4 1 or whether a settlement agreement
is memorialized in the record transcript.42
32. Brief for the States, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1363 (1994) (No. 93-
263).
33. Id. at 1.
34. The term "supervisory jurisdiction" refers generally to the doctrine that permits courtsto supervise the activities of litigants outside the courthouse. It may also be read as analogous to
the ancillary, pendant, or now, supplemental jurisdiction of federal courts.35. Brief for the States at 2, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1363 (1994)(No. 93-263).
36. Id. The amici argued that the High Court had only peritted the exercise of "supervi-
sory jurisdiction" in three limited circumstances: (1) where supervisory jurisdiction is "trulygrounded in statutory authority," see id., at 4 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967)); (2)
where the Supreme Court has invoked its own power to supervise the administration of criminaljustice in the lower federal courts, see Brief for the States at 4 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364U.S. 206, 216 (1960); (3) where needed to secure compliance with the terms and conditions of its
own decrees, see Brief for the States at 5 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1978);
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932)).37. Brief for the States at 10, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1363 (1994)(No. 93-263); see also infra notes 143-152 and accompanying text.38. Brief for the States at 15, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1363 (1994)(No. 93-263).
39. Id. at 16.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id. at 18.
42. Id. at 19.
1995]
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IV. KOKKONEN v. GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE Co.
A. Facts
Guardian Life Insurance Company fired Matt Kokkonen after he
served the company as an agent for fourteen years.43 In response,
Kokkonen filed a suit in 1990 against Guardian in California Superior
Court in Thare County, California." Kokkonen alleged a variety of
state law claims, including fraud, wrongful termination, and wrongful
denial of lease.45 He sought compensatory and punitive damages.46
Guardian counterclaimed, alleging conversion and unfair competi-
tion.47 On diversity grounds Guardian removed the case from the
state court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of California.'
After a three-day jury trial in March 1992, but before the judge
issued jury instructions, the parties agreed to settle the case.49 On the
record, they discussed the terms of settlement with federal Judge Rob-
ert Coyle,50 who stated to the parties that he did not want to see them
back in his court due to a breach of the settlement agreement. 51
Although the parties discussed the settlement terms with the judge at
the in-chambers conference, they never reduced the oral settlement to
a written instrument.52 The parties prepared a Stipulation and Order
of Dismissal With Prejudice,53 in anticipation of dismissal of the
43. See Linda Mullenix, The Inherent Jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Enforce Settlement
Agreements in Dismissed Cases, 1994 Sup. CT. PRE iEw 174 (Feb. 18, 1994).
44. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. CV-90-00325-REC (E.D. Cal. 1990).
45. Linda S. Mullenix, supra note 43, at 174.
46. Linda S. Mullenix, supra note 43, at 174.
47. Linda S. Mullenix, supra note 43, at 174.
48. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1674 (1994).
49. ld. at 1674-75.
50. Id.
51. Brief for Respondent at 11, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1674 (1994)
(No. 93-263)[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
52. See Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675.
53. Id. The parties took these actions pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii). The order
provided as follows:
It is hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between the parties hereto, through their
undersigned attorneys, that plaintiff's entire Complaint against defendant The Guard-
ian Life Insurance Company of America herein be, and the same hereby is, dismissed
with prejudice, without costs or attorneys' fees in favor of any party against the other.
It is hereby further stipulated and agreed, that defendant The Guardian Life Insur-
ance Company of America's entire cross-complaint against plaintiff herein be, and the
same hereby is, dismissed with prejudice without costs or attorneys' fees in favor of any
party as against the other.
Stipulation and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No.
CV-90-00325-REC (E.D. Cal. 1990).
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complaint and cross-complaint. Judge Coyle signed these under the
notation, "It is so ordered." 4
A month later, Guardian filed a motion seeking enforcement of
the settlement agreement, alleging that Kokkonen had breached.5 5
Kokkonen responded that the district court lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction to enforce the agreement5 6 because the case was no longer
pending before the court and because the court lacked independent
federal grounds to hear the enforcement motion.5 7 Judge Coyle re-
jected Kokkonen's arguments, claimed jurisdiction and issued an en-
forcement order against Kokkonen 5 8
B. Treatment in the Ninth Circuit
Relying solely on his jurisdictional objection, Kokkonen appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.59 That court, in an
unpublished opinion, affirmed Judge Coyle's decision. 0 In doing so,
it relied upon Wilkinson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,6' in which
it asserted that federal district courts have "inherent" jurisdiction to
enforce settlement agreements on the grounds of preservation of
court authority and the furtherance of judicial economy.62
The Ninth Circuit asserted that district court jurisdiction required
that it be able to enforce agreements with respect to an action pending
before the court.63  However, in the court's unpublished opinion it
54. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. 92-16628, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12488, at *1
(9th Cir. May 16, 1994).
58. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 922 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1991). In Wilkinson, the appellants reached a settlement agree-
ment with the F.B.I. that provided for the production of certain documents related to the appel-
lants' activities, Id. at 556-57. The district court entered final judgment and dismissed the
appellants' claims. Id. at 557. Subsequently, the F.B.I. allegedly improperly redacted 43,600
pages of the documents. Id. The appellants sought to compel the federal agency to produce
them. Id. In response, the F.B.I. asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction over the settlement
agreement. Id. Characterizing the appellant's motion as one for the enforcement of a settlement
agreement, the Ninth Circuit asserted jurisdiction, claiming that "[d]istrict courts have the inher-
ent power to enforce settlement agreements." Id.
62. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675.
63. Kokkonen, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12448, at *1. The Ninth Circuit stated that a
district court has the "inherent power summarily to enforce a settlement agreement
with respect to an action pending before it .... The authority of a trial court to enter ajudgment enforcing a settlement agreement has as its foundation the policy favoring the
amicable adjustment of disputes and the concomitant avoidance of costly and time con-
suming litigation."
Id. (quoting Dacaney v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978)).
7
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neither addressed nor applied a rule for determining whether a partic-
ular settlement dispute threatens court authority.' 4
As a second basis for continuing jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit
asserted the need to preserve scarce judicial resources. 65 The court
chose not to require Guardian to seek relief under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)66 or to pursue formal dismissal of the prior or-
der and the institution of a new action in state court, both of which
would have required the additional expenditure of scarce judicial
time, resources, and personnel.67 The Ninth Circuit's position was
bolstered by the fact that the trial was complete, except for the issu-
ance of jury instructions, when the parties settled.68
In the Ninth Circuit, Guardian argued that an additional basis for
asserting continuing jurisdiction existed; Judge Coyle expected he
would have such jurisdiction.69 Judge Coyle had commented at length
to the parties during the in camera hearing that he did not want to see
them back in his courtroom due to a breach of the settlement agree-
ment.70 However, Judge Coyle did not put his intent in writing as
required by the Federal rules.71 Rather, he merely dismissed the suit
with prejudice and did not retain jurisdiction over the settlement
agreement. 72
64. See Kokkonen, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12448, at *1.
65. Kokkonen, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12448, at *2 (citing Dacaney v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d
1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1978)).
66. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides, in part: "On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
67. These goals are consistent with the Law and Economics Movement, which has generally
sought a wiser expenditure of scarce judicial resources. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The
First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REv. 993 (1990); Gary Minda, The Juris-
prudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 Omo ST. L. J. 599 (1988); James B. Zimarowski et al., An
Institutionalist Perspective on Law and Economics (Chicago Style) in the Context of United States
Labor Law, 35 Aimz L. RFv. 397 (1993).
68. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1674-75.
69. Brief for Respondent at 5, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1637 (1994)
(No. 93-263).
70. Id. at 23. For instance, in discussing with the parties their settlement agreement, Judge
Coyle stated that "I'm just trying to get this straight, and it makes sense and that you can all live
with [it]. I don't [want to] see you all back here in the future." At another point, Judge Coyle
stated: "I don't want to see you people come back here to have the agreement enforced. I don't
want to see anybody fooling around, that's all I can say .... You all have better things to do
than worry about coming back here." Brief for Respondent, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co., 114 S. Ct. 1637 (1994) (No. 93-263), 1994 WL 137026 at 20.
71. See FED. R. CIv. P. 41.
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C. The Issue Before the Supreme Court
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed one central
issue. That is, does a federal district court have subject matter juris-
diction to enforce a settlement agreement entered into between par-
ties when: (1) the case is no longer before the court at the time of the
order, having been dismissed with prejudice prior to an application for
enforcement of the settlement agreement; (2) the settlement agree-
ment was never incorporated into an order of judgment by the court
disposing of the action; (3) the federal district court did not expressly
retain jurisdiction; and (4) there exist no other independent grounds
for federal court jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement?73
The Court answered this jurisdictional question in the negative.
V. Ti SuPREMvE COURT'S DECISION IN Kokkonen
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction does not
grant a federal district court inherent jurisdiction to hear a post-dis-
missal motion to enforce a settlement agreement between parties who
are no longer otherwise subject to the court's jurisdiction.74 Beyond
that, because a settlement agreement is nothing more than a contract,
where a district court does not expressly retain jurisdiction over the
parties or does not embody the settlement agreement in its dismissal
order, and there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the
enforcement of that agreement is a matter solely for state courts.75
VI. ANALYSIS op TH= DECISION
The Court's decision in Kokkonen is significant because it clearly
sets the boundaries of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine, preserves
state sovereignty to hear contract disputes that are only incidentally
touched by federal courts, and reinforces federalism in an age when
the separation between federal and state governments is increasingly
blurred. By laying down a bright-line rule, the decision also assures
that federal court litigants who settle their claims will not be cheated
of judicial due process if one party later alleges a breach.
73. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 62 U.S.L.W. 3598, 3598 (U.S. March 15, 1994).
74. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676-77.
75. Id. at 1677.
1995]
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A. Ancillary Jurisdiction Does Not Extend Far Enough to Enforce
the Settlement Agreement
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction authorized continuing district
court jurisdiction.76 It refuted that court's reliance on previous
Supreme Court dicta suggesting jurisdiction was proper and necessary
in order to deliver the fruits of settlement agreements.77 The Court
took the opportunity to clarify the proper rationale for the "supple-
mental jurisdiction" doctrine78 and the two situations where it can be
applied.7 9 Neither of those situations contemplates the enforcement
of a settlement agreement. 81
Guardian had persuaded the Ninth Circuit that the district court
had "inherent" authority to enforce a settlement agreement in order
to make sure that each party got what it had bargained for in the set-
tlement.81 The Supreme Court found this argument off the mark and
chastised Guardian and the Ninth Circuit for relying on dicta rather
than the holdings of cases.82 It pointed out that the case holding prin-
cipally relied upon was "not remotely as permissive as its language. '83
Further, the Court noted an important factual distinction be-
tween the case upon which Guardian had relied and Kokkonen. The
court in the earlier case had "expressly reserved" continuing jurisdic-
tion over the parties.84 Judge Coyle, while aware of the terms of the
76. Id. at 1676-77. Federal ancillary jurisdiction is now treated under 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(1988) as supplemental jurisdiction. See generally CHARLEs A. Wiorr, ARTHUR MILLER, AND
EDWARD H. COOPER, 13 FED. PRAa & PRoc. § 3523 (1984 & Supp.); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus,
The Debate Over § 1367 Defining the Power to Define Federal Judicial Power, 41 EMoRY L.J. 13
(1992); Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute - A Constitutional
and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 849 (1992); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supplemental
Jurisdiction Statute: An Important But Controversial Supplement to Federal Jurisdiction, 41 EM.
oRY LJ. 33 (1992).
77. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676 (citing Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 113-14
(1904) (quoting 1 C BATES, FEDERAL EouIrY PROCEDURE § 97 (1901)).
78. The Court utilized the long-familiar nomenclature of "ancillary jurisdiction."
79. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. The Court noted that the "expansive language of Julian can be countered by (equally
inaccurate) dicta in later cases that provide an excessively limited description of the doctrine."
Id. As an example, Justice Scalia referenced Fulton National Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier, where
the Court said that "no controversy can be regarded as dependent or ancillary unless it has direct
relation to property or assets actually or constructively drawn into the court's possession or
control by the principal suit." Id. (quoting Fulton Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276,
280 (1925)).
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settlement agreement between Kokkonen and Guardian Life,8" did
not reserve district court jurisdiction. 6 Indeed, the Stipulation and
Order which he signed "did not so much as refer to the settlement
agreement. '87
The Court also rejected Guardian's claim that Judge Coyle's clear
contemplation of jurisdiction warranted its exercise.88 In doing so, it
contributed much to the cause of judicial certainty. The Court spared
appellate courts the burden of determining whether a particular dis-
trict judge contemplated jurisdiction enough to allow the further exer-
cise of judicial supervision of litigants who had left the courthouse.
There seems to be little doubt that if the Supreme Court had pas-
sively assented to the assertion that "contemplation" was enough,
considerable uncertainty would result. For example, on what basis
would courts decide "how much contemplation is enough?" Could a
party successfully argue that a judge's statements and body move-
ments combined to show a clear "contemplation" of continuing juris-
diction? Could parties argue that, based on a particular judge's
previous decisions on like matters, "surely the judge contemplated"
jurisdiction? Fortunately, the Court has shielded parties, attorneys,
and courts from having to make such determinations.
The Court did not reject in Kokkonen what is now called the
"supplemental jurisdiction" doctrine.89 However, it found the doc-
trine was too narrow to permit its application to the enforcement of
the settlement agreement between Kokkonen and Guardian." Using
the familiar language of "ancillary jurisdiction," 91 the Court said the
doctrine can only be exercised for two reasons:9' (1) to dispose of
85. Id. at 1675.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1677.
89. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676-77. The "Supplemental Jurisdiction" statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 (1990), has replaced the prior doctrines of "ancillary" and "pendent" jurisdiction in fed-
eral courts. See generally CHARsmn A. WRIGir ET AL., 13 FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3523 (1984 &
Supp.)
90. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676-77.
91. For a discussion of the nuances of the doctrines of ancillary and pendant jurisdiction,
and supplemental jurisdiction, see supra sources at note 72.
92. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676-77. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia left open the
possibility for further application of the doctrine by noting that "generally speaking," the Court
had recognized jurisdiction for the two reasons discussed in Kokkonen. Id. at 1676.
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factually interdependent claims93 or (2) to ensure that the court's au-
thority is protected. 94 Guardian satisfied neither.95
In discussing the use of ancillary jurisdiction to permit a court to
dispose of claims that are in some ways factually interdependent,96 the
Court noted as an example its holding in Baker v. Gold Seal Li-
quors.97 Justice Douglas, writing for that Court, stated that it was
proper for a district court to exercise ancillary jurisdiction to evaluate
a judicially imposed set-off of awards that imposed a net loss on trust-
ees of a railroad in reorganization. 98 As the Baker Court said,
"[o]rdinarily where a court has primary jurisdiction over the parties
and over the subject matter, the power to resolve the amount of the
claim and the counterclaim is clear."99
Unlike Baker, the original claims and counterclaims presented in
Kokkonen were not factually interdependent with the jurisdiction
claim. 0 0 In fact, as far as the Court was concerned, they had "nothing
to do with each other."'1 1 Although the Court gave this argument
summary treatment, it is not difficult to see that the evidence neces-
sary to prove the underlying claims of wrongful termination, wrongful
denial of lease, conversion and unfair competition differed from evi-
dence necessary to show breach of the settlement agreement.
Although the facts of Kokkonen did not satisfy the "factual inter-
dependence" test, the Court could have gone further. It could have
identified the level of interdependence necessary to show that claims
are factually interrelated. Doing so would have further clarified the
"transaction and occurrence" test now set forth in the Federal
Rules"° and encouraged a further slowing of the increase in federal
court litigation.
The Court in Kokkonen delineated a second ground upon which





97. Id. (citing Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc. 417 U.S. 467, 468-69 (1974)). The test for
determining factual interdependency is the "transaction and occurrence test." The test is set out
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a): "[a] pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises
out of the same transaction and occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim .... FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
98. Baker, 417 U.S. at 468, 469.
99. Id. at 468-69.
100. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676.
101. Id.
102. FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a).
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that jurisdiction is necessary to facilitate successful court function,
"that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectu-
ate its decrees."'1 3 As an example, the Court cited Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc.,'° which involved an action for specific performance by
a television station purchaser. The station owner decided not to sell,
and, despite a contract and a court order directing him not to do so, he
took actions in district court, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, the Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court that
were intended to prevent the sale. 05 The district court described
some of these actions as "emasculat[ing] and frustrat[ing] the pur-
poses of... the power of [the district] court.., to prevent NASCO's
access to the remedy of specific performance."'0 6
The Court responded to the challenge to its authority. It recog-
nized ancillary jurisdiction to compel the payment of opposing party's
attorney's fees as a sanction for misconduct. 0 7 Quoting Anderson v.
Dunn,10 8 the Chambers Court said, "Courts of justice are universally
acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to im-
pose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission
to their lawful mandates."' 0 9 These vestments provide the ability to
fashion "an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial
process." 110
The Supreme Court noted that both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit in Kokkonen had relied upon this second reason for as-
serting ancillary jurisdiction."' However, it suggested that under the
Kokkonen facts, such reliance was misplaced." 2 The exercise of ancil-
lary jurisdiction in Kokkonen was not, in the opinion of the Court,
necessary to protect its proceedings or vindicate its authority." 3 The
Court noted that Guardian sought the imposition of power that was
quite "remote" from that required by a court to perform its goal." 4
103. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., the
Court stated that "[t]he exercise of supervisory authority is especially appropriate in the deter-
mination of the procedures to be employed by courts to enforce their orders, a subject that
directly concerns the functioning of the judiciary." 481 U.S. 787, 809 (1987).
104. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
105. Id. at 35-37.
106. Id. at 36.
107. Id. at 55.
108. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821).
109. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43.
110. Id. at 44-45.
111. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676-77.
112. Id.
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The denial of continuing jurisdiction did not undermine the dis-
trict court's authority because Judge Coyle had not rested his author-
ity on its dismissal of the lawsuit." 5 Judge Coyle did not incorporate
the terms of the settlement agreement into his order," 6 nor did the
parties create a separate provision in the settlement agreement that
would empower the district court to "retain jurisdiction.""' 7 Had
either occurred, jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement
would have existed." 8 Instead, Judge Coyle only ordered that the
case be dismissed." 9 As such, no matter how egregious Kokkonen's
acts may have been, they could not frustrate the court's instruction to
dismiss the case. In short, Kokkonen did not threaten the court's ad-
judicative role merely because Guardian had to go elsewhere to seek
enforcement of its settlement agreement with Kokkonen.
When the Supreme Court rejected Guardian's claim that Kok-
konen had threatened the district court's authority, it thereby rejected
an expansive interpretation of that authority. Implicit in the decision
is the view that district courts possess a unique role in our society as
powerful adjudicators. By virtue of their presence in every state, dis-
trict courts permit disputants of all income levels and all mobility to
bring their federal question or diversity claims to an arena where they
can be spared the parochial prejudices sometimes common to state
courts. 2 ° If that unique role is to be preserved, disputants must re-
spect the authority of the court and its jurisdiction to enforce its actual
rulings.
However, this unique role does not require federal district courts
to roam "to and fro [upon] the earth"' 2' in search of disputants who
become disgruntled once they have left the courthouse. Nor does that
role require that the federal courthouse doors remain open to such
litigants. As the amici properly noted, there is nothing preventing an-





119. Id. at 1675.
120. The possibility of such prejudice was recognized by the Supreme Court early in this
country's history. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). For a
recent article that recognizes this potential problem as it applies to defending "deep-pocket"
clients, see Robert L. Haig and Steven P. Caley, Deep Pocket Perils: Defendants Rich in Re-
sources Must Act to Overcome Bias, 80 A.B.A. J. 59 (Dec. 1994).
121. Job 1.7 (King James).
122. Brief in Support of Petitioner at 7, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life, 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994)
(No. 93-263): "No doctrine of necessity requires [the power to enforce settlement contracts] to
[Vol. 30:671
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It is clear that the Supreme Court did all courts a favor when it
rebuffed the Ninth Circuit's broad expression of "inherent" jurisdic-
tion.123 Had the Court failed to do so, federal courts would have been
faced with the prospect of never ending jurisdiction and litigants who
might not carefully consider their settlement agreements beforehand
on the assumption that "if it didn't work out," they could always have
the federal judge fix the problem. Docket management could con-
ceivably become a nightmare.
B. State Courts Remain the Proper Forum for Most Contract
Disputes
The Kokkonen decision preserves state power to hear contract
disputes. As far as the Supreme Court was concerned, the dispute
Judge Coyle was asked to rule on stood apart from the underlying suit
involving claims of fraud and wrongful termination. 4 Rather, he was
asked to rule solely on a contract, part of the consideration for which
was the dismissal of an earlier federal suit. Unless the breach of con-
tract action had an independent basis in federal court,"z the proper
forum for this action was state court.'
26
This view validated the amici's assertion that "a settlement agree-
ment reached between the parties is a private contract, enforceable by
the standard means of bringing a civil action under the common
law."'127 A settlement agreement is nothing more than a contract, bar-
gained for by the parties. Each party agrees to abide by the terms of
that contract, only one of which is that the parties will jointly stipulate
to have their case dismissed.' 28 That stipulation is self-executing; it
"does not depend for its efficacy on the entry of any order by the
court."' 29 The terms of the settlement agreement need not be
included.'3 0
be exercised by the federal courts, since the state courts stand available to adjudicate such claims
and resolve disputes." Id.
123. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675, 1677.
124. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676-77.
125. For example, if the settlement agreement itself was valued at over $50,000 and was
between parties of different states, the federal court would have diversity jurisdiction.
126. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1677.
127. Brief in Support of Petitioner at 2, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1673
(1994) (No. 93-263).
128. The district court must accept "a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties." FED. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(ii).
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It is this private nature of the settlement agreement that distin-
guishes it from the "judicial consent decree." Through the latter, the
district court terminates by direct order and judgment the litigation
before it.' 3' The court may specify terms by which the parties must
abide.'32 A failure to comply with a term would then represent a fail-
ure to comply with a court order.
The Court prevented considerable judicial uncertainty by requir-
ing that parties go to state court for their enforcement actions when
the federal district court has not retained jurisdiction and when the
settlement agreement lacks its own federal jurisdictional basis. Be-
cause settlement contracts often involve matters of considerable com-
plexity and even some uncertainty that have not even been reduced to
writing,133 a district court would be left with little guidance to deter-
mine whether and how an agreement should be enforced, absent an
entirely new action on the merits.
C. Federalism in Kokkonen
Kokkonen presented to the Court a central question: "How
much reach does a federal court have?" To answer the question, the
Supreme Court returned to the well-known federalist bulwark that
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 34 Federal courts pos-
sess only that power authorized by the Federal Constitution and by
statutes.35 In fact, as Chief Justice Ellsworth wrote for the Court in
Turner v. Bank of North America, 36 with respect to circuit courts of
appeal, "a circuit court.., has cognizance, not of cases generally, but
only of a few specially circumstanced . "... 137 It is presumed that a
131. Id. (citing Note, Separation of Powers and The Reagan Administration's Policy on Con-
sent Decrees: Have the Courts Overstepped the Limits of Judicial Powers?, 1989 U. ILL L. R.v.
541 (1990).
132. Brief in Support of Petitioner at 11, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1673
(1994) (No. 93-263).
133. See generally, Hoffman, supra note 1.
134. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675. Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution states
that the judicial power extends to cases and controversies "arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority
.U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
135. Id. See Willy v. Coastal, 503 U.S. 131 (1992). See also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch.
Dist., 475 U.S. 531, 542 (1986).
136. 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 8 (1799).
137. Id. at 11.
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cause of action rests outside a federal court's jurisdiction.138  The
party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proving otherwise.139
Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution identifies those
cases which are "specially circumstanced.' 140  That section provides
federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction over "all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made under this Authority... between Citizens of
different States .... ,,4 The United States Congress has implemented
§ 2142 by providing that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $50,000... and is between.., citizens of different States."'
1 43
The original dispute between Kokkonen and Guardian Life was "spe-
cially circumstanced." The two parties were deemed citizens of differ-
ing states and their amount in controversy exceeded $50,000.1'
The limited constitutional and statutory grants of power to fed-
eral courts are consistent with the Constitution's establishment of a
federal form of government in which the national government exer-
cises jurisdiction only over certain matters that concern the several
states or those matters which are necessarily within the scope of the
federal government's role as representative of the states. Powers not
specifically reserved to the national government are reserved to the
states.45
In Kokkonen the Court implicitly reemphasized the primacy of
the Constitution that established our federal form of government.
138. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675 (citing Turner, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) at 11).
139. Kokkonen, 114 S. CL at 1675 (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298
U.S. 178 (1936)).
140. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
141. Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution continues, including in its reach those cases
"affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; -to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction;.. . - [to controversies] between citizens of different States; - between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under the Grant of different states .... "U.S. CONsT. art. III,§ 2.142. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)-(a)(1) (1988). A debate continues to rage over the questions of
whether a federal district court would have authority to hear these disputes in the absence of the
congressional grant of power in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and whether Congress has really
granted to federal courts the full authority made possible under the Constitution. For a brief
discussion of these matters see JACK H. FRIEDENMAL ET AL, CrVIL PROCEDURE §§ 2.5 - 2.6, at
23-37 (2d ed. 1993).
143. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and (a)(1) (1988).
144. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1674. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
145. U.S. CONST. art. X. The utility of a federal system is born out in research that reveals
that a decentralized form of government furthers both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the
government, thereby limiting the potential for the destruction of the system. For a classic state-
ment of such considerations, see SEYMOuR MARTn' LnsET, POLITICAL MAN: Tim SOCIAL BA-
SES OF PoL.rrcs (Johns Hopkins Press, 1981).
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While it should have been long ago settled that it is the Court's re-
sponsibility to do SO,1 46 it is not a foregone conclusion that it would
always, particularly in an age when some view the Constitution as
something other than the "Supreme Law of the Land."'1 47
The Kokkonen decision reinforces the position that certain mat-
ters are beyond the reach of automatic federal jurisdiction; the Court
reasserts the rule that the role of the federal courts is limited. Such a
restatement should not be taken lightly. In an age of increasing fed-
eral regulation, a limitation on the ability of federal courts to decide
these disputes leaves open to state review decisions on everything
from the purchase of real and personal property to employment
matters.
The Court gave deference to federal concerns in Kokkonen at the
expense of concerns about judicial economy. Guardian had argued
that judicial economy mandated the exercise of post-settlement
jurisdiction.148 With the minimum claim for diversity jurisdiction in
federal court now over $50,000,149 and with large annual increases in
civil caseloads in federal court,150 it is easy to understand the appeal
for an ever wiser expenditure of scarce judicial resources.1 51 This is
particularly true in Kokkonen, where the trial, complete with closing
arguments, had concluded.'
146. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
147. U.S. Representative Jack Shields, who in the summer of 1994 represented Texas' eighth
congressional district, is among those who have expressed concern about such sentiment. In a
1994 article in the Houston Post, Shields expressed concern over environmentalists who argue
that the Endangered Species Act, federal wetlands regulations and other environmental protec-
tion measures should supersede the Constitution. Jack Shields, Proposed Measures Won't Leave
Wetlands Owners High and Dry, HOUSTON POST, July 17, 1994, at C3.
148. Brief for Respondents at 25-26, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1673
(1994) (No. 93-263).
The litigants quite conceivably would be forced to exhaust the judicial resources of
both federal and state courts, potentially to retry a case under needlessly difficult cir-
cumstances. The costs to the parties of the various proceedings in the federal and state
forums would, of course, be considerable. Permitting the only court familiar with the
case ... to exercise jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement or, alternatively, to
restore the case to the docket and proceed quickly to a trial on the merits, provides a
significantly more efficient and effective means of resolving the dispute.
Id. at 56-57.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988).
150. David S. Clark, Civil Procedure, in INTRODUCrION TO THE LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES
(David S. Clark & 1Tgrul Ansay eds., 1992).
151. This position is part and parcel of the Law and Economics jurisprudential movement.
The movement's proponents have argued that an efficient allocation of judicial resources is a
wise allocation of those resources. See, e.g., Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the
1980s, 50 Omo ST. L. J. 599 (1989).
152. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1674-75.
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However, what may be expedient from a resource allocation per-
spective may not be rational when viewed through a constitutional
lens. As one Constitutional scholar has commented, "the Constitution
cannot be cabined in any calculus of costs and benefits." '153
While courts may want to allocate scarce judicial resources more
efficiently, the Supreme Court has affirmed the principle that constitu-
tional concerns must preempt economic ones.154 In a case the Court
used to strike down the legislative veto power over executive branch
actions, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for the Court in language
that should be applicable to any weighing of constitutional versus eco-
nomic considerations:
[I]t is crystal clear from the records of the [Constitutional] Conven-
tion, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the framers
ranked other values higher than efficiency ....
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitu-
tional Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that
often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard
choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a form
of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go un-
checked. There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this
Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often
encountered in complying with explicit Constitutional standards
may be avoided .... With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness,
and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to pre-
serve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the
carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.
155
D. Preserving Due Process
By rejecting the Ninth Circuit's assertion of "inherent" jurisdic-
tion to enforce settlement agreements, the Supreme Court assures
that litigants who settle their disputes will not be denied due process
for doing so if a party later alleges a breach. The Court's decision
implicitly recognizes that a settlement is a private, not a public, judi-
cial, determination and that the parties considering a settlement
agreement will weigh similar factors far differently than they will if
they are preparing for trial.
153. Laurence Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98
HAXv. L. Rnv. 592, 592 (1984).
154. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983).
155. Id. at 958-59.
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A settlement agreement is not a judicial determination. 156
Rather, it is a private contract. 5 7 A party considering such a settle-
ment contract will likely consider and weigh the numerous variables
differently from the way that party would if it were preparing for
trial. 58 For example, a "deep pocket" defendant may choose to settle
a claim if negative publicity, a tarnished reputation, or its perceived
wealth could lead to a risky jury trial.' 59 That party may also decide
that settlement will help it avoid the expensive emotional costs associ-
ated with going to trial and waiting for a verdict.' 60 It may decide that
settlement will help to maintain a desirable long-term relationship,' 61
prevent the unwanted publicity of a trial,162 or make fair recompense
without having to pay heavily in the "all or nothing" environment of
the trial. 63 Settlement may even help curry the good will of an oppo-
nent.' 4 Whether a party was liable for whatever injury occurred to
the other party may never be considered.
For a court to enforce a settlement agreement reached by parties,
irrespective of a determination of liability, is to deny parties their day
in court. To enforce the settlement agreement is to deny one party the
right to defend, with all its constitutional, statutory, and common law
judicial protections, against the claim that it breached the settlement
contract. By denying to federal district courts the automatic power to
enforce settlement agreements between litigants dismissed with preju-
dice, the Kokkonen Court has guarded parties' due process rights
against assault on the basis of expediency.
E. Practical Implications of the Kokkonen Decision
The practical implications of the Kokkonen decision are several.
The case requires settling parties to decide at the time of settlement
whether they want supervision of their settlement agreements by the
court in which the case pends. For those who want such supervision,
156. Brief in Support of Petitioner at 10, Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994) (No. 93-263).
157. Id.
158. See generally, Hoffman, supra note 1. Hoffman discusses at length the considerations
parties make in determining whether to settle their disputes. These considerations require "tak-
ing into account all of the economic and noneconomic costs of both settlement and trial." Id. at
3-4.
159. See, e.g., Robert L. Haig & Steven P. Caley, Deep-Pocket Perils: Defendants Rich in
Resources Must Act to Overcome Bias, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1994, at 59.
160. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 33.
161. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 34.
162. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 35.
163. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 34.
164. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 35.
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the decision supplies clear guidelines for seeking that goal. For those
who do not initially seek such jurisdiction or whose efforts are rebuf-
fed, the court leaves as an open door the 60(b) motion. Actions by
federal district courts since Kokkonen have revealed a middle way
that attorneys may employ if a court is reluctant to retain jurisdiction.
Parties who decide to settle their disputes must decide up front
whether they want the federal district court to stand prepared to en-
force the terms of their agreement. If parties do not decide and do
not act, they should stand prepared for a federal district court to re-
fuse enforcement for lack of jurisdiction.
Attorneys for parties who decide that district court supervision is
desirable must make sure that dismissal documents they provide to
the court, or those provided by the court, are drafted with precision.
They must have the court either "retain" jurisdiction under Rule
41(a)(1)(ii) or make it part of its dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). How-
ever, in either case, the Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction. 65
The Kokkonen decision does not leave room for post-settlement
jurisdiction merely because the judge makes statements, clear or not,
that contemplate continuing jurisdiction. 166 Guardian provided in its
brief to the Supreme Court substantial quotations from Judge Coyle
which demonstrated his belief that he had the power to enforce the
settlement agreement. In fact, Judge Coyle likely believed that Wil-
kinson167 provided him that power. However, Judge Coyle's state-
ments and well-meaning contemplation of jurisdiction were
immaterial to the rule the Court laid down in Kokkonen.
If a federal district court does not "retain jurisdiction," or if the
settlement agreement is not incorporated into the dismissal order, a
party may move the court to vacate its dismissal order under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). However, not every circuit will grant a
60(b) motion for the breach of a settlement agreement. 68 Where a
particular circuit does so, Kokkonen seems to require that a party
clearly request the dismissal. Guardian had argued strenuously that
the court should treat its motion to enforce the settlement agreement
as a Rule 60(b) motion even though it was in the "wrong form.'
'1 69
165. See FED. R. Crv. P. 41.
166. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1677.
167. Wilkinson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 922 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1991).
168. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
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The Court chose not to respond to this argument, even though it rec-
ognized that some circuits would likely grant a 60(b) motion under
similar circumstances.
The Court's failure to confront this issue leaves an unanswered
question. Although the Court implied that it is currently inclined to
require more than the breach of a settlement agreement to vacate a
dismissal under Rule 60(b), it did not settle the matter. Rather, it
drew a distinction between a 60(b) vacation, which permits the contin-
uation or removal of the dismissed suit, and a motion for the enforce-
ment of a settlement agreement, which seeks a damage award or a
decree of specific performance. The latter, said the Court, requires its
own basis for jurisdiction. 170  Had the Court squarely addressed
Guardian's argument, it might have settled the dispute within the cir-
cuits over whether the breach of a settlement agreement is sufficient
grounds for a judge to vacate the court's dismissal order under Rule
60(b).' 7'
Since the Kokkonen decision, several district courts have granted
60-day Orders of Dismissal that preserve the right to return to the
courthouse for the breach of a settlement agreement but still allow the
court quickly to discharge its docket.172 In a recent case from Louisi-
ana, 173 a United States District Court issued a 60-day order that held
out the possibility of judicial enforcement of the settlement agreement
if the parties approached the court with "good cause." However,
when the plaintiff asked the court more than a year later to enforce
the settlement agreement, the court rejected the plaintiff's motion for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 74
170. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675-76.
171. Not all courts agree that the breach of a settlement agreement is sufficient grounds for a
judge to vacate a dismissal order under Rule 60(b). In Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., the Third
Circuit held that the breach of a settlement agreement was an insufficient reason to set aside a
dismissal order where the settlement agreement was not a part of the record, not incorporated
into an order of the district court, and where the court did not manifest an intent to retain
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. 989 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1993). See also Harman v.
Pauley, 678 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1982). But see Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 937
F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that one party's repeated failure to comply with a settlement
agreement had completely frustrated the purpose of the agreement justifying the vacation of a
dismissal order under 60(b)(6)). See also Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. Fairfax County,
571 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1978); Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1976).
172. See, e.g., Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 1994).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Settlement agreements are invaluable for discharging overbear-
ing dockets in federal court and for furthering the long-term interests
of the parties to them. However, like other contracts, they are suscep-
tible to breach. The Kokkonen decision recognizes this reality, and it
leaves the federal courthouse door open to enforce settlement agree-
ments. However, in the interests of state sovereignty, the preservation
of due process for litigants, and docket management, the decision has
only left the door open a bit, and it requires those who seek federal
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